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Note 
 
Call For Reform: Analyzing Trips Through 
European Seizure Of Generic Medication 
Justin Erickson∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has long been a subject of 
controversy in international patent law. In the past, 
medications were subject to strict patent protection from 
domestic laws but little international protection. However, the 
dramatic increase in prevalence of communicable diseases led 
to a sharp increase in demand from developing countries that 
had not developed their own pharmaceutical industries. 
Because of this demand, there was a substantial increase in the 
trade of pharmaceuticals. Such an increase led to the violation 
of domestic patents of many countries, which prompted the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to implement international 
patent protection standards through the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”). 
These standards, though, have been the subject of much 
criticism that has manifested itself through the drastic actions 
many countries are taking to protect their domestic industry. 
One such example is the seizing of ships with generic 
medications. Countries seizing the medication claim protection 
under international agreements. At the same time, countries 
whose domestically produced medication has been seized claim 
that such seizures are in violation of international agreements. 
This ambiguity is costly and requires resolution. 
This note seeks to understand the conflict in TRIPS 
 
∗ Justin Erickson is a J.D. Candidate (2013) at the University of Minnesota 
and holds a B.A. from Wartburg College. This note would not have been 
possible without the support of his wife, Molly Erickson and his parents, Rick 
and Cindy Erickson. Special thanks also goes to the staff of the Minnesota 
Journal of International Law, in particular Julia Norsetter, Matt Stearns, and 
Charles Sutton, for their efforts on this note. 
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through recent European Union (E.U.) seizures of Brazilian 
and Indian medications. Part II describes the implementation 
of TRIPS and provides the factual background of the conflict 
over drug seizures. Part III analyzes the specific complaints 
made by Brazil and India to the WTO, and the resulting 
settlement between the E.U. and India.  Then, the analysis 
looks to the resolution of the India and E.U. case to understand 
how TRIPS may be clarified in the future.  
The purpose of this note will be two-fold. First, there will 
be an analysis of the cause of this conflict: the inherent 
flexibilities found within TRIPS. This will consist of a study of 
two primary parts of TRIPS: the extent countries can use 
TRIPS as the basis for production of generic medications in the 
violation of patents, and the measures countries can take to 
enforce their own domestic laws.  The analysis of this second 
issue will specifically examine whether the E.U. had the 
authority to seize the generic medication under TRIPS. Such an 
analysis demonstrates the need for further clarification of the 
scope of this agreement.  
The second part of this note will examine the Indian 
settlement to determine whether either of these issues has 
been solved. Such an analysis will demonstrate that the recent 
litigation has helped to clarify enforcement aspects of TRIPS 
while leaving production questions unanswered.  This will set 
the stage for discussion about how the settlements’ provisions 
will more broadly impact the rest of the international 
community.   
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIPS  
Adopted during the Uruguay Round, TRIPS was created in 
response to concerns over international patent protection and 
came into effect in 1995.1 The growth of global trade led to 
concerns over inconsistencies in patent laws.2
 
 1. See Overview: The TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 
2012) [hereinafter Overview].  
 Loose patent 
protection created tensions in trade negotiations and in overall 
 2. See Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Intellectual property: protection and 
enforcement] (emphasizing the various forms of intellectual property rights 
protections and enforcement measures enacted by WTO Members). 
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economic relationships.3 WTO Members negotiated TRIPS to 
facilitate innovation and ensure protection for domestic 
suppliers through establishing a minimum level of patent 
protection.4
TRIPS covers three basic areas.
  
5 First, TRIPS required 
that Members adhere to substantive obligations of previously 
signed treaties, which had laid out international patent 
protection standards, and provided a minimum standard.6 
Second, Members were required to develop domestic remedies 
and enforcement procedures that would allow a patent-holder 
to pursue a claim if necessary.7 Members were to develop 
criminal procedures and border protection remedies to 
prosecute those found in violation of patent agreements.8 Third, 
the agreement permitted utilization of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement procedures within the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding.9
The adoption of TRIPS did not come without significant 
opposition,  particularly from developing countries.
  
10 Fewer 
than 20 developing countries were involved in the negotiations, 
a rather unrepresentative group, given that as of 2009 there 
were 106 developing countries bound by the treaty.11 Indeed, 
many developing countries had a poor understanding of the 
scope and implications of signing on.12
 
 3. See id.  
 Furthermore, through 
 4. See Overview, supra note 1 (stating that TRIPS is a minimum 
standards agreement, meaning that Members are required to meet the 
standards of the agreement but are free to make provisions more extensive for 
increased intellectual property protection if they so desire). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. (noting that TRIPS required that Members comply, with minor 
exceptions, with the most recent versions of the Paris Convention for 
Production of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization).  
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id.; Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, App. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401. 
 10. See Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck, Developing Countries in the Global IP 
System Before TRIPS: The Political Context for the TRIPS Negotiations, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
UNDER WTO RULES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE WTO VOLUME I, 22, 42–
43 (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2010) (stating that many developing countries 
believed TRIPS was not an ideal agreement). 
 11. Id. at 46. 
 12. Id. 
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TRIPS, developing countries agreed to increased standards for 
IP protection, while receiving few or no concessions from 
developed countries to ensure the availability of necessary 
goods, such as essential medicines.13 Indeed, one commentator 
suggested that TRIPS  will force developing countries to 
undertake significant legal and economic reforms consistent 
with free market principles,14  requiring developing countries to 
adopt policies that favored the interests of developed countries.  
Of much greater importance to developing countries was the 
need to develop domestic infrastructures in education, and 
other areas of society, which would assist in implementing and 
sustaining an intellectual property regime.15 Further, 
developing countries have unique cultural norms which would 
be “particularly vulnerable to infringement.”16 Despite these 
differences, developing countries signed on to TRIPS to ensure 
access to new technology and to take advantage of opportunity 
to design legislation in conjunction with their own interests.17
Thus, it came as no surprise that conflict quickly arose 
over the implementation of TRIPS. This conflict was 
particularly heated in the area of public health.
 
18 The rise and 
spread of diseases such as AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria 
caused many countries to look for a manner in which they could 
protect access to medications, whether through compulsory 
patent licenses, allowing the production of generic forms of 
medication, or by declaring a national health emergency.19
 
 13. See CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY OPTIONS 3 
(2000). See also Ruth L. Gana, Prospects For Developing Countries Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735, 739–740 (1996) (arguing 
that the TRIPS Agreement put heavy IP protection burdens on developing 
countries, which were not as active in negotiations as developed countries, and 
provided them little benefit in return). 
 This 
led other countries, particularly those with developed 
pharmaceutical industries, to argue that TRIPS protected their 
 14. See Gana, supra note 13, at 735. 
 15. Id. at 744. 
 16. Id. at 767. 
 17. See CORREA, supra note 13, at 8 (stating that developing countries will 
be able to use the TRIPS obligations to design domestic laws focused on 
internal policies); Gana, supra note 13, at 373 (arguing that the TRIPS 
agreement would help developing countries to utilize international technology 
flows). 
 18.  See The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/index.html 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2012) [hereinafter World Health]. 
 19. See id. 
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own domestic patents.20 Generic medication producers and 
suppliers in poor countries justified their production by arguing 
that TRIPS allows for justified infringement of patents for the 
purpose of protecting public health.21
The dispute over generic medication production grew to the 
point that most Members felt an international solution was 
needed.
 
22 This solution came in 2001, at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Doha.23 The WTO members adopted a ministerial 
declaration, known as the Doha Declaration, which stated that 
TRIPS should be interpreted “in a manner supportive of public 
health . . . .”24 The Doha Declaration reaffirmed several terms of 
TRIPS as important measures in protecting public health. 
Chief among these was the ability to grant compulsory licenses, 
a substantial tool for generic pharmaceutical producers.25 
Compulsory licensing gives government bodies the broad 
authority to “license the use of a patented invention to a third 
party or government agency without the consent of the patent-
holder.”26 While there are some restrictions on compulsory 
licensing, these restrictions are fairly flexible and can be 
waived at the country’s choosing.27 Additionally, the Doha 
Declaration reaffirmed a country’s freedom to designate which 
public health emergencies justified an infringement of the 
patent.28
The Doha Declaration also provided a boost to least-
  
 
 20. Cf. Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, supra note 2. 
 21. Specifically, generic producing countries argued that TRIPS provided 
flexibility, pointing to provisions which allowed countries to grant licensing 
rights in order to better protect the general public, particularly during a public 
health crisis. The degree of flexibility within TRIPS remains unclear.  See id. 
 22. See generally World Health, supra note 18 (“In 2001, WTO Members 
adopted a special Ministerial Declaration at the WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Doha to clarify ambiguities between the need for governments to apply the 
principles of public health and the terms of [TRIPS].”). 
 23. See id. 
 24. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 
2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 748 (2002), ¶ 17 [hereinafter Doha 
Declaration]. 
 25. See World Health, supra note 18. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. Article 31 of TRIPS laid out several conditions that countries 
were required to fulfill before issuing a compulsory license, such as 
demonstrating unsuccessful negotiations with the patent owner and payment 
to the patent owner. The country could also waive these requirements by 
claiming a public health emergency. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 
I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 28. See World Health, supra note 18. 
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developed countries (“LDC”) by extending the amount of time 
they had to implement domestic patent protections.29 Initially, 
TRIPS called for each country to implement legislation that 
would ensure other country’s patents were protected by 2006.30 
The Doha Declaration extended this deadline for LDCs to 
2016.31 This extension specifically targeted public health 
related patents, providing additional relief to LDCs that had 
not been able to enact the proper regulatory regimes.32
Perhaps more importantly, the Doha Declaration was 
enhanced by a General Council decision made in August 2003, 
which laid out a process to ensure the availability of 
medications to LDCs.
 The 
adoption of the Doha Declaration gave generic medication 
producers additional flexibility to address public health 
concerns.  
33 This decision created a process by which 
LDCs could import generic medications from other countries 
under TRIPS. The Doha Declaration recognized that some 
countries were unable to develop their own medications, and so 
it directed Members to find a solution to this problem.34 The 
General Council decision solved this issue by holding that a 
country could use compulsory licensing solely for exporting to 
LDCs  if it notified the WTO and the medications were 
produced for a country unable to produce them on their own.35
Despite the clarity the Doha Declaration brought to TRIPS 
for issues of public health, many problems still remained. First, 
many countries claim TRIPS is still not an adequate solution to 
public health issues.
  
36
 
 29. See id. (recognizing that immediate adoption of TRIPS ran counter to 
the public health concerns of many LDCs).  
 At the same time, many in the 
pharmaceutical industry argue that the Doha Declaration 
 30. Cf. World Health, supra note 18.  
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. 
 33. World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council, 
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509 (2003), ¶ 6 
[hereinafter General Council Decision]. Paragraph 6 of this decision instructed 
WTO Members to create a mechanism for LDCs to gain access to medications. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. ¶ 2.  
 36. See, Peter Hildpold, WTO Laws and Human Rights: Bringing 
Together Two Autopoietic Orders, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323, 361–62 (2011). 
The Doha Declaration was criticized for improving only the access to life-
saving treatments and medications. Many felt such limited access excluded 
important health concerns. Furthermore, the requirement of payment to the 
patent holder was often times impossible as many countries simply did not 
have the money. 
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provided too much flexibility to generic manufacturers.37 Such 
flexibility, they suggest, stifles innovation and creativity.38 The 
pharmaceutical companies argue that many countries took 
advantage of the Doha Declaration, using the authority it 
granted individual countries to operate with only their own 
interests in mind,39 and that many countries who claim public 
health as a rationale for compulsory licensing are actually able 
to afford medication.40 As a result of these conflicts, Members 
are able, and have threatened, to bring legal action through 
WTO dispute resolution procedures.41
B. THE SEIZURE OF GENERIC MEDICATIONS AND SUBSEQUENT 
LITIGATION 
 
Given the tension over TRIPS and the Doha Declaration, it 
was only a matter of time before conflicts elevated beyond 
diplomatic disagreements. Such was the case with the 
shipment of generic medications through the E.U. by India and 
Brazil. At least twenty times, medicines shipped from India 
and bound for Latin America were stopped and seized by the 
E.U.42 These seizures sparked complaints from many 
developing countries, who claimed that the drug seizures 
violated international law.43
The tension over the seizure of generic medication finally 
reached a tipping point in May 2010. E.U. officials, operating 
through the Netherlands, stopped and seized a shipment of 
generic medication bound for Brazil (and eventually other 
Latin American countries).
 
44
 
 37. See, Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, and the Doha “Solution”, 
3 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 47, 66 (2002). 
 These medications were produced 
 38. See id. (alluding to the fact that the Doha Declaration undermines the 
policy goals of TRIPS, as pharmaceutical companies argue that the ability to 
claim a “health emergency” with no penalty for false statements, forces 
additional costs to be borne by the original manufacturer). 
 39. Id.  
 40. See, e.g., id. at 66–67. The G-8 had committed new economic aid to 
help developing countries fight disease. Such aid, they argued, should be 
partially used to remunerate the pharmaceutical industry under Article 31 of 
the TRIPS agreement. Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry has argued 
the remuneration is only effective if research and development costs are taken 
into consideration. 
 41. See generally Overview, supra note 1 (outlining the use of the WTO’s 
dispute resolution system in conflicts regarding TRIPS). 
 42. See John W. Miller & Geeta Anand, India Prepares EU Trade 
Complaint, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124949598103308449.html 
 43. See id. 
 44. See India, Brazil Raise Dispute over EU Drug Seizures, THIRD WORLD 
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in India and were stopped in the Netherlands in transit when 
Dutch customs officials seized the cargo.45
C. INDIA AND BRAZIL FILE SUIT IN THE WTO 
 
Unlike previous seizures, India and Brazil moved quickly 
to file legal action, lodging a complaint with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body.46 The WTO opened consultations, the first 
step in its dispute settlement process.47 The Brazilian 
government asserted that the E.U. was in violation of 
international law.48 India, while somewhat more measured in 
its public declarations, wanted assurance that its shipments 
would no longer be affected by E.U. customs officers.49
Brazil was one of the leaders in the use of generic 
medications to combat health emergencies, and India was a 
major international player in the manufacture and export of 
generic drugs.
  
50 As such, both used TRIPS to great effect. 
Ironically, many Indian parliamentarians had raised concerns 
about TRIPS shortly after its adoption.51 Many Indian human 
rights activists believed that TRIPS, if implemented 
imprudently, would provide the pharmaceutical industry with 
too much protection.52 Without domestic safeguards they 
believed TRIPS could cause dramatic increases in the cost of 
medications.53
 
NETWORK (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/2010/twninfo100509.htm. 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. Indian Ambassador Ujal Singh Bhatia noted the WTO 
complaint was filed over two primary concerns. First, he expressed that he 
believed the EU was acting at the request of their patent holders. Second, he 
articulated that the drugs were legally produced under WTO rules and that 
the EU had failed to respond to requests for information on the seizure. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. Ambassador Roberto Azevedo of Brazil said these seizures "are 
a clear violation of WTO disciplines on the freedom of transit, which is one of 
the cornerstones of the multilateral trading system. This is even clearer . . . 
when there is no doubt on the lack of patent protection for the goods either in 
the exporting country or in the importing country." Id. 
 49. See India, Brazil Raise Dispute Over EU Drug Seizures, supra note 44. 
 50. Mario Osava, Brazil Imports Generic AIDS Drugs from India, China, 
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Sept. 5, 2003), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=19997. 
 51. Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of 
TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 
1571, 1587 (2009). 
 52. MSF, a humanitarian group, was concerned was that TRIPS 
implementation would grant too much international protection to new uses for 
known substances. Id. at 1586–87. 
 53. Many humanitarian groups protested against an ordinance passed by 
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India sought to take advantage of the Doha Declaration, 
arguing that because its constitution guaranteed a right to 
health, it was required to interpret international agreements in 
a manner that favored supply of medication.54 To do this, India 
implemented a domestic patent enforcement system which set 
very high standards for what could be considered patentable.55 
Such a patent system likely played a large role in allowing 
India to become an international leader in the development and 
exportation of generic medications because it led to increased 
competition in the pharmaceutical market. Brazil also took 
advantage of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration to develop a 
strong generic market. While Brazil did not have the 
constitutional requirement of health, it was the primary 
conduit for generic medications en route to most Latin 
American countries.56 In order to meet these demands, Brazil 
took advantage of compulsory licensing, using it to respond to a 
variety of public health emergencies.57 Furthermore, Brazil 
used the threat of compulsory licensing to negotiate favorable 
deals with the pharmaceutical industry, providing them access 
to patented medication at prices that were far below market 
value.58
Litigation quickly proceeded against the E.U., with Brazil 
and India initiating a trade dispute in May of 2010. Brazil and 
India argued that the E.U.’s actions violated several Articles of 
both TRIPS and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(“GATT”).
  
59
 
the Indian parliament which brought it into compliance with TRIPS. They 
argued the ordinance should have included domestic limitations on India’s 
obligations to respect patentability on known substances. Id. at 1586–87. 
 First, India cited two different provisions of TRIPS. 
 54. Timothy Bazzle, Note, Pharmacy of the Developing World: Reconciling 
Intellectual Property Rights in India with the Right to Health: TRIPS, India’s 
Patent System and Essential Medicines, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 785, 799 (2011). 
 55. Kapczynski, supra note 51, at 1589. India created two requirements to 
determine whether a given item was deserving of a patent. First, the subject 
matter of the item had to be unique. This meant that if a medication was 
made of already known substances, it could not be patented unless it enhanced 
efficacy. Id. at 1590–1593. Second, India set an extremely high level for the 
“inventive step” requirement of patents. It required the inventive step to 
represent a technical advance or have economic significance; an “unusual, and 
perhaps unique” inventive step provision. Id. at 1594. 
 56. Osava, supra note 50. 
 57. Id.; Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as 
Measured by Compulsory Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 387–88 (2011). 
These public health emergencies were declared under Brazilian standards. 
 58. Harris, supra note 57, at 387–88. 
 59. See Request for Consultations by India, European Union and a 
Member State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, ¶¶ 1–5, WT/DS408/1 (May 
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It claimed authority to produce the medication under Article 4 
of the Paris Convention and the General Council Decision of 
2003 on the implementation of the Doha Declaration.60  Second, 
India noted that the E.U.’s seizure was in violation of GATT 
Article V (it interfered with the free transit of goods) and 
Article X (it constituted non-uniform administration of trade 
practices and regulations).61  India also argued that the E.U. 
seizures were made in violations of Articles 7, 8, 28, 41, and 42 
of TRIPS.62 Brazil, in turn, filed a more extensive complaint. In 
addition to the violations India cited, Brazil charged that the 
E.U. seizure was in violation of Article XVI of the GATT and 
Articles 49–55, 58, and 59 of TRIPS.63
Brazil and India were primarily concerned with three 
issues arising from the seizures. First, Brazil and India argued 
that they had acted in full compliance with TRIPS, but that the 
E.U. measures were not administered in a uniform manner, 
despite the requirement contained in Article X of the GATT 
that measures be administered in a “uniform, impartial and 
reasonable manner.”
 
64 India argued that the E.U. measures 
were unreasonable because they involved enforcing strict 
patent control procedures without regard to the flexibilities 
TRIPS provided to generic producers.65 Second, Brazil and 
India wanted to ensure protection of their thriving generic 
market.66
 
19, 2010); Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Union and a Member 
State—Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, at 4, WT/DS409/1 (May 19, 2010).  
 Third, they claimed that the E.U. was disregarding 
 60.  Id. ¶ 3.India argued that it was within its rights to produce and ship 
the drugs under the public health exceptions found in the TRIPS agreement. 
 61. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2. Article V allowed for the free transit of goods (subject to 
reasonable customs examinations), while Article X required member states to 
disclose customs regulations and restrictions on imports and exports. India 
charged that the EU failed to provide information about the rationale for the 
seizures. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. X, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 62. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶¶ 1, 3–5. 
 63. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59 Brazil was much 
more aggressive than India, seeking to apply this ruling beyond generic 
medication. C.f. Bruce Lehr, EU-India Settle WTO Drug Trade Dispute, THE 
BIG RED BIOTECH BLOG (Dec. 13, 2010, 10:33 AM), 
http://thebigredbiotechblog.typepad.com/the-big-red-biotech-blog/2010/12/eu-
india-settle-wto-drug-trade-dispute.html/ (describing how quickly the EU-
India dispute was resolved). 
 64. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. 
 66. Id. ¶ 5 (claiming Article 31 of  TRIPS authorized the production of 
exportation of generic medications through compulsory licensing). The 
pharmaceutical industry in India was valued at over $12 billion in 2009 and is 
projected to grow to $55 billion by 2020, and generic pharmaceuticals 
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WTO regulations and acting only on behalf of patent holders.67
While the E.U. never officially answered the Request for 
Consultations, Ambassador Eckart Guth had previously made 
statements to the WTO justifying the drug seizures. 
Ambassador Guth cited TRIPS Article 51, which gave it 
authority to suspend cargo shipments if they were in violation 
of international patent laws.
  
68 Ambassador Guth also 
emphasized that the drugs were returned to India after 
investigation, the seizure was temporary, and regardless of 
whether the cargo was produced properly, international law 
allowed for temporary seizures while customs officials checked 
the origin of the cargo.69 E.U. officials argued that the cargo 
was only being checked to ensure that it would not be diverted 
and sold into E.U. ports in violation of domestic patent law.70
With the case having been filed, parties began preparing 
for consultations. Five countries (Canada, China, Turkey, 
Japan, and Ecuador) joined the litigation, demonstrating the 
importance of the issue at hand: interpretation of the 
contentious TRIPS agreement and subsequent declarations.
  
71
D. RESOLUTION WITH INDIA; CONTINUED LITIGATION IN BRAZIL 
 
The E.U. was particularly interested in avoiding protracted 
litigation and therefore sought to settle the claims with each 
country. There was some speculation that the E.U.’s interest in 
settlement was in part motivated by a free trade agreement it 
was negotiating with India.72
 
produced by India constitute nearly twenty percent of global supplies. 
Pharmaceuticals, INDIA BRAND EQUITY FOUND., http://www.ibef.org/ 
industry/pharmaceuticals.aspx (last updated Feb., 2012). 
 Regardless, the E.U. quickly 
 67. See id. ¶¶ 1–5 (discussing the list of GATT and TRIPS articles 
violated). See also India, Brazil Raise Dispute over EU Drug Seizures, supra 
note 44 (arguing the E.U. seized the medications under pressure from the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
       68.     Eckart Guth, Ambassador of EU to WTO, EC Intervention (WTO 
General Council, (Feb. 2009) available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/files/WTO_GENERAL_COUNCIL.doc 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. See also Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, 13 INTELL. 
PROP. PROGRAMME 4 (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/39772/. 
 71. Prashant Reddy, China, Canada, Japan, Turkey, Ecuador Seek to 
Join Consultations in the Indo-E.U. Trade Dispute over Seizure of ‘In-transit’ 
Generic Drugs, SPICY IP (July 22, 2010, 3:58 PM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/07/china-canada-japan-turkey-ecuador-
seek.html. 
 72. See e.g., Lehr, supra note 63. See also Matthias Williams, India, EU 
Heal Drug Seizures Dispute with Interim Settlement, REUTERS, JULY, 28, 2011, 
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entered into settlement talks with India. 
These talks eventually bore fruit, and a settlement was 
reached in October 2010.73 The E.U. agreed to undergo 
substantial reforms to its customs and patent enforcement 
procedures.74 In return for these changes, India suspended its 
pursuit of the claim, though India retained the right to revive it 
should the E.U. fail to make satisfactory reforms to its customs 
regulations.75 Despite the Indian settlement, there was no 
progress made in the Brazilian case. There has been little 
discussion about this, but the lack of a free trade agreement 
negotiation with Brazil likely put less pressure on the E.U. to 
reach an immediate settlement.76
III. ANALYSIS   
  
This analysis seeks to understand the ways in which 
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration are ambiguous and the ways 
in which the Indian settlement clarified this ambiguity. First, 
we turn to Article 1.1 of TRIPS, cited by Brazil in its request 
for consultations.77 Article 1.1 states that countries may 
“determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and 
practice.”78
 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/india-eu-drugs-
idUSL3E7IS4WW20110728 (discussing how generic medications have become 
a hot button issue between India and the E.U. as they conclude a free trade 
agreement); EU, India Resolve Spat Over Generic Drug Settlements, But FTA 
to Wait Until 2011 INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/98989/htm (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2012) (calling the drug seizure dispute “an irritant” in broader free 
trade negotiations). 
 The discretion allowed in Article 1.1 providing 
countries flexibility while implementing generic production 
resulted in considerable tension. Brazil used the flexibility to 
 73. George Mathew, India, EU Settle Generic Drug Seizure Issue, THE 
INDIAN EXPRESS (Oct. 8, 2010, 3:17 AM), 
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/india-eu-settle-generic-drug-seizure-
issue/694259/1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Press Release, Gov’t of India, India EU Reach an Understanding on 
Issue of Seizure of Indian Generic Drugs in Transit (July 28, 2011), available 
at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=73554. 
     76. However, Mercorsur and the European Union have recently reentered 
negotiations over a free trade agreement. See Mercosur, EUROPEAN COMM. 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/regions/mercosur/htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012). Brazil may have 
accepted the terms of India’s settlement as adequate as well. 
 77. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59. 
 78. TRIPS, supra note 27. 
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aggressively implement compulsory licensing to bolster its 
generic pharmaceutical sector.79 At the same time, the E.U. 
used this discretion to implement an aggressive customs 
system that led to extensive seizure of medications. The broad 
discretion allowed in Article 1.1 is essentially the root of the 
controversy, while the individualized implementations of 
TRIPS by each country amplify its ambiguity and demonstrate 
its inherent flaws.80
A. DID INDIA AND BRAZIL HAVE THE RIGHT TO PRODUCE AND 
TRANSFER THE GOODS? 
  
Likely a chief concern for the E.U. was that the aggressive 
generic production of India and Brazil went beyond the goals 
and purposes of TRIPS and that India used TRIPS to create a 
lucrative generic market. The dispute between the E.U. and 
India and Brazil thus embodied a more fundamental concern: 
the interpretation of TRIPS and the Doha Declaration. Do 
countries such as India and Brazil have the right to license, 
produce, and export generic medications under TRIPS? An 
analysis of the arguments presented demonstrates that TRIPS 
fails to definitively answer this question. Such ambiguity leads 
to enforcement problems. 
India first claimed authority to produce the medication 
based on a reading of Article 28, in combination with Article 2, 
Article 4bis of the 1967 Paris Convention, and the Decision of 
the General Council of August 30, 2003 on the Implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.81 Article 28, as 
discussed above, defines the rights provided to a patent holder 
and essentially gives the holder sole use of production.82 Article 
2 reaffirms the commitments to previously negotiated 
agreements involving intellectual property.83 These Articles 
provide an international standard for patent protection.84
As described in India’s request for consultations, India 
combines these TRIPS rights with the Paris Convention and 
Doha to assert a broad authority to produce generic medication. 
 
 
 79. Harris, supra note 57, at 387–88. 
 80. For reference, the other Articles used by India and Brazil were 2, 7, 8, 
28, 31, 41, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, and 59. Request for Consultations 
by India, supra note 59; Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59. 
 81. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 3. 
 82. TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 28. 
 83. Id. at art. 2.  
 84. See Overview, supra note 1 (describing these articles as the standards 
of patent protection under TRIPS).  
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First, Article 4bis of the Paris Convention ensures the right of 
countries to independently grant their own patents.85 Here, 
India uses the Article as a basis for India’s own production of 
generic drugs, indicating that a drug manufacturer must have 
been granted a patent by India in order to receive protection 
from the Indian government, even if the medication produced 
violates other countries’ patents.86
India then uses the Doha Declaration to expand its 
authority to produce medication under the Paris Convention.
 
87 
India does this by relying on Paragraph 6(i) of the Decision of 
the General Counsel of August 30, 2003 on the implementation 
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.88 Paragraph 6(i) 
provides a waiver under Article 31(f) of TRIPS, which had 
originally allowed countries to violate a patent only if the 
product produced was to be used for its domestic population.89 
Under Paragraph 6(i), countries can export pharmaceutical 
products to developing countries, provided that the importing 
country makes the exporting country aware of the need for such 
medication and demonstrates that it does not have the capacity 
to produce the drug on its own.90
India combines these documents to broadly define its right 
to produce generic medication under TRIPS. Essentially, India 
argues that any pharmaceutical drug that originated from 
India could not be interfered with, provided it was 
manufactured and exported under the requirements of the 
Doha Declaration as interpreted in the General Council 
decision.
 
91
 
 85. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4bis, as 
last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 
1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 303 (“Patents applied for in the various countries of the 
Union by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of patents 
obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether members of the 
Union or not.”). 
 India argues that “the rights conferred on the owner 
of a patent cannot be extended to interfere with the freedom of 
     86. See Request for Consultations by India, supra note 60, ¶ 3. 
 87. Id. Comparatively, the Paris Convention dealt more with the rights of 
countries to produce goods independent of other countries’ laws. 
 88. Id As discussed previously, this decision was meant to provide 
guidance on providing pharmaceutical products to developing countries which 
were unable to develop their own pharmaceutical industry. 
 89. See Decision of the General Council, supra note 33. Originally, India’s 
actions would have violated Article 31 because most of its generic medications 
were exported. TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31. 
 90. Least developing countries do not need to demonstrate an inability to 
produce the medication. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2. 
 91. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 3. 
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transit of generic drugs lawfully manufactured within, and 
exported from, India.”92 The broad reach of India’s 
interpretation becomes even more evident when examining the 
nature of specific E.U. drug seizures. For example, one seizure 
targeted generic anti-hypertensive drugs.93 Hypertension, more 
commonly known as high blood pressure, is a very common 
affliction.94 The Doha Declaration was primarily implemented 
as a solution to high-profile public health emergencies, with the 
declaration specifically listing HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and 
malaria as examples.95 India’s production of hypertension 
medication exceeds the intended limits of the Doha Declaration 
and TRIPS. Hypertension, while serious, has not risen to the 
level of a public health crisis on the scale of HIV/AIDS.96
This is not to say that India’s production of such 
medication is necessarily unjustified. Indeed, high blood 
pressure is a serious affliction that can lead to severe medical 
problems.
 Thus, 
India’s production of hypertension medication demonstrates 
that India justifies the breaking of patents for many drugs far 
beyond the intended scope of the Doha Declaration, though, as 
will be discussed below, India can argue that the list of diseases 
in Doha is simply a non-exhaustive starting point. Essentially, 
India has ensured itself a lucrative generic industry, valid 
under TRIPS provided it serves developing countries. 
97
 
 92. Id. 
 In fact, India may argue that the list of diseases in 
the Doha Declaration is not a closed list. Moreover, the Doha 
Declaration was implemented to confirm “that the [TRIPS] can 
and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner 
supportive of WTO Members’ right to protect public health and, 
 93. Tim Stirrup & Katherine Hebditch, EU dispute with India and Brazil 
up Stakes in Generics Saga, BALDWIN INTELL. PROP. (July 21, 2010), 
http://www.baldwins.com/eu-dispute-with-india-and-brazil-ups-stakes-in-
generics-saga/. 
 94. High blood pressure (hypertension), MAYO CLINIC (Mar. 22, 2011) 
http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/high-blood-pressure/DS00100. 50 million 
people in the United States alone suffer from hypertension, which is nearly 
thirty percent of the population. Vincent R. Moloney, High Blood Pressure: 
Can You Prevent It? Lower It?, BLOODPRESSURE-DRS-PRACTICAL-GUIDE.COM, 
http://www.bloodpressure-drs-practical-guide.com/highbloodpressure.html. 
 95. Doha Declaration, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4–6; See World Health, supra 
note 18 (arguing that widespread epidemics were the driving force behind the  
Doha Declaration). 
 96. C.f. Junaid Subhan, Scrutinized: The TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, 9 MCGILL J. OF MED., 152, 156 (2006) (arguing that high cholesterol 
does not rise to the level of AIDS or other communicable diseases). 
 97. See High blood pressure (hypertension), supra note 94. 
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in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”98
First, public health can be defined very inclusively. 
Merriam Webster defines public health as “the art and science 
dealing with the protection and improvement of community 
health by organized community effort and including preventive 
medicine and sanitary and social science.”
 Such a 
broad statement lends considerable support to India’s claim.  
99 Such a definition 
clearly is not limited to life-threatening illnesses. Certainly the 
treatment of hypertension can be included here, both in terms 
of community health and preventative medicine. Second, the 
last statement, “to promote access to medicines for all” is 
persuasive as well. Because India could argue that it was 
trying to provide medicine to developing countries, it can claim 
that it is doing nothing more than fulfilling the purpose of the 
Doha Declaration. It is ensuring that developing countries have 
access to a supply of medicine through generic production, a 
need recognized in paragraph 6i of the 2003 General Council 
decision.100
Many countries, however, claim that the Doha Declaration 
was intended to promote access to essential medications.
  
101 
Essential medications, they argue, are those meant to treat 
diseases specifically listed in the Doha Declaration, those that 
were contagious and spreading.102 Were this definition adopted, 
many of the generic drugs produced by India would probably be 
produced in violation of TRIPS. Applying this definition 
specifically, there is a strong case to be made that hypertension 
is not the type of communicable disease that falls under Doha 
protection. Hypertension, while perhaps genetic, is not able to 
ravage a country in the way AIDS or malaria have.103
India further reaffirms its claim to produce medication by 
citing Article 31, in conjunction with the General Counsel 
decision.
 This first 
subsection of India’s argument demonstrates a conflict over the 
scope and applicability of TRIPS to given medications. Without 
a resolution, further enforcement measures could be taken by 
patent holders, leading to more litigation. 
104
 
 98. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001). 
 Here India argues that international exceptions to 
 99. MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/medlineplus/ 
public%20health (June 11, 2010).  
 100. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 6. 
 101. Subhan, supra note 96. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
    104.  Request for Consultations by India, supra note 60, ¶ 4. 
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TRIPS allow for the production of generic medication.105 Article 
31 provides several exceptions for when patents can be 
infringed upon.106 Most prominent among these is the national 
emergency exception, which permits a country to produce 
generic medication in violation of TRIPS if such production is to 
deal with a public health emergency.107 Each country is allowed 
to decide what determines such an emergency; there is no 
international standard.108 India reinforces this with the General 
Council decision, declaring that it can use compulsory licensing 
to produce medications for developing countries that have an 
inability to produce such medication.109
Some critics have argued that such a conclusion is against 
the collective interest of LDCs and alternative policies such as 
public funding of medical therapies, international aid, or price 
discrimination by patent holders should instead be 
considered.
 This essentially allows 
India to produce any medication without payment to the patent 
holder for any country that declares a public health emergency 
(under Article 31b) and claims a need for the medication. Such 
a conclusion greatly expands India’s right of production under 
TRIPS and the Doha Declaration. 
110 Furthermore, the E.U. may argue that the Doha 
Declaration does not waive these obligations; indeed, the 
General Council Decision specifically holds that only Article 31f 
is waived under Doha.111 The E.U. could also argue that there is 
little penalty for countries declaring public health emergencies 
without good cause and that such conduct must be curtailed.112
However, the Doha Declaration makes compulsory 
licensing a much more feasible tool for developing nations, 
provided they possess the adequate manufacturing capacity.
 
113
 
 105. Additionally, India raised complaints over Articles 41 and 42. Id. ¶ 5.   
 
 106. See TRIPS, supra note 27, at art. 31(b).  
 107. Id. This Article holds that use without “reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions” with the right holder should be taken only in cases of “national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”   
   108.   See id. (allowing countries to use patents without authorization in 
cases of emergency, but providing no definition of when an emergency exists). 
 109. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2. 
 110. See Sykes, supra note 37, at 66–67 (discussing alternatives to the 
current right of production predicated on national emergency). 
 111. General Council Decision, supra note 33, ¶ 2. As discussed earlier, 
Article 31f requires compulsory licensing for domestic use only. 
 112. For support of such an idea, see Sykes, supra note 37, at 66 (arguing 
that the costs of declaring public health emergencies are often externalized, so 
there is little incentive not to declare them). 
 113. See id. at 55 (arguing that Doha allows for compulsory licensing to be 
used more effectively for developing nations to achieve their goals, mainly 
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Combined with TRIPs, which, under Article 31, requires only 
payment of “adequate remuneration” for compulsory licensing 
if the importing country has declared a national emergency,114  
the benefits of compulsory licensing far outweigh the 
consequences. Countries such as India would be able to benefit 
individually from such measures, while externalizing most of 
the costs of lost research incentives to the collective world.115
B. DO WTO PRECEDENTS CLARIFY THE AMBIGUITY OVER 
GENERIC MEDICATION PRODUCTION? 
  
A look at WTO case law reaffirms this ambiguity over the 
manner in which generic medications are protected under 
TRIPS. Only one TRIPS case has ever reached the litigation 
stage, a case between China and the United States.116 In this 
dispute, the United States brought a complaint claiming that 
China had failed to create and enforce domestic measures to 
prevent counterfeiting (not of generic medications).117 The WTO 
panel was the first to address the enforcement obligations of 
TRIPS.118  The WTO panel, however, only reinforced the idea 
that TRIPS can and should be applied flexibly.”119 The WTO 
panel found that TRIPS was meant to be applied differently 
depending on the industry being covered.120
 
lower prices). 
 Scholars found that 
 114. Such remuneration may be minimal. Id. at 66. 
 115. The costs externalized to collective nations center primarily around 
the loss of valuable research incentives. Sykes, however, argues that because 
individual countries make up such a small fraction of the market, their 
decision to infringe on patents results in little loss of research incentive and 
thus an individual country will see no harm in engaging in compulsory 
licensing. However, if all developing countries behave this way there will be 
little incentive to research medications for diseases found in developing 
countries. This creates a collective action problem Id. at 65–66.  
 116. Patricia Judd, Toward a TRIPS Truce, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 613, 616 
(2011). The United States argued that China had violated Article 61 of the 
TRIPS agreement. 
 117. Id. The case concerned the piracy of digital music files and other 
electronic media. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Report of the Panel, China–Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶¶ 7.605, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 
2009) (citing Report of the Panel, United States–Section 110(5) of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, ¶¶ 6.113, 6.178, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000)  (finding that the 
panel should consider market-specific conditions when determining whether a 
violation of TRIPS has occurred.  
 120. Id. See also Judd, supra note 116, at 617 (finding that the WTO 
“piracy" in China may affect the market differently than piracy in Germany 
and that one must assess piracy of books differently than peer-to-peer trading 
of digital music files.”) 
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the WTO panel only reinforces the fact that TRIPS should be 
applied differently based upon the product in question and 
which country is developing the product.121
Thus, TRIPS and the Doha Declaration fail to definitively 
answer what generic medications may be produced in a manner 
that fulfills the goals of both TRIPS
 This should be seen 
as a positive sign for generic medication producers because it 
could be seen as an indicator that the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism will interpret TRIPS in a lenient 
manner in public health circumstances. Case law thus fails to 
provide an answer to what specific medications can be produced 
under the auspice of TRIPS. Indeed, if anything, the WTO 
panel decision only adds to the ambiguity and need for 
guidance. At the very least, the WTO’s decision suggests a 
flexible approach, which greatly favors generic medication 
producers. 
122 and the Doha 
Declaration.123 While many scholars agree that TRIPS (and the 
Doha Declaration) should be interpreted in a flexible manner,124 
this case demonstrates that there is a need for clarification. 
Billions of dollars may be at stake in these seizures.125 
Frequently these seizures end with the confiscation of drugs, 
which prevents them from reaching their intended patients.126
 
 121. Id.  
 
More importantly, there is a human element to consider. Drug 
seizures could delay the arrival of truly essential medicine to 
many developing countries. More guidance from the WTO 
would allow for the more efficient transportation of medicines, 
 122. See Overview, supra note 1 (discussing passage of TRIPS). 
 123. See World Health, supra note 18. 
 124. See Judd, supra note 116, at 617 (citing Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit All? Making the WTO 
Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in Incentives for Global Public Health: 
Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines 51, 53 (Thomas Pogge, 
Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstien eds., 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443248; Peter K. Yu, The 
Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 981 
(2009)).   
 125. See Nageshwar Patnaik, India Tops Exporting Generic Medications, 
THE ECONOMIC TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-03-
07/news/28443868_1_generic-medicines-india-tops-pharmaceutical-industry 
(finding that India exports over $8 billion a year in generic medications). 
 126. See Jennifer M. Freedman, India, Brazil Complain at WTO Over 
Generic Drug Seizures by European Union, BLOOMBERG, MAY 12, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-12/india-brazil-complain-at-wto-over-
generic-drug-seizures-by-european-union.html (“EU permits customs 
authorities to confiscate goods in transshipment. . . .”) 
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saving time and money. 
C. THE INDIAN AND E.U. SETTLEMENT FAILS TO DETERMINE 
WHAT GENERIC MEDICATIONS CAN BE PRODUCED. 
Unfortunately, guidance regarding the production of 
generic medication did not come from resolution of this case. As 
was previously discussed, India and the E.U. were able to reach 
a settlement, in which the E.U. made several concessions 
regarding enforcement proceedings in exchange for suspension 
of India’s claim in the WTO.127
Specifically, the settlement does little to clarify what 
generic medications are protected under TRIPS.
 These concessions answer 
important questions regarding TRIPS and will be discussed 
later. What is also important, though, is what this settlement 
does not cover. 
128 There are 
two conclusions that can be drawn from this lack of 
clarification. First, one could infer that the E.U. did not 
challenge the production of any generic medication because 
such production is accepted, provided that it does not violate 
the patents of the producing country or destination country. 
Support for this claim is found within the statutory language of 
Doha, which allows countries the flexibility to determine what 
a public health emergency is, allowing them to take broad 
advantage of generic production.129 Further support can be 
drawn from the fact that countries are free to implement their 
own procedures to gain access to generic medications. Indeed, 
because countries have this ability, through rights to 
implement compulsory licensing and other techniques,130
Such an interpretation, though, assumes that TRIPS was 
created to promote access to all medicine. While such an 
aspiration may now be a goal of many,
 a 
conclusion can then be drawn that the TRIPS exceptions 
provide countries the freedom to determine what medications 
are essential. As such, one could argue there is no need to 
determine what drugs are protected under the TRIPS 
exceptions. 
131
 
 127. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 
 it clashes with a 
75. 
 128. See Id. (showing no discussion about whether the drugs produced were 
legal under TRIPS and its exceptions). 
 129. See Doha Declaration, supra note 24, ¶¶ 4–6 (providing countries with 
flexibility to declare public health emergencies and to take appropriate 
measures to deal with such a crisis). 
 130. Id. 
 131. For support of such an interpretation, Bazzle, supra note 54, at 785 
(arguing that a country’s definition of public health could allow it to claim the 
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number of the ideas that drove the creation of TRIPS. At its 
inception, TRIPS only allowed patents to be violated to improve 
access to life-saving medications, suggesting that improved 
access to all medicines was not necessarily intended.132 
Furthermore, the need to declare a public health emergency in 
order to invoke the TRIPS exceptions greatly limits its 
effectiveness, suggesting a similar conclusion.133
However, the E.U. never raised the point that the drugs 
were produced in violation of TRIPS; instead, the E.U. focused 
solely on the issue of whether the drug seizures themselves 
were lawful..
 
134 Had the case proceeded to a WTO panel, the 
E.U. could have raised an interesting argument that would 
have allowed the WTO to better define the scope of TRIPS and 
the Doha Declaration. Unfortunately, because the settlement 
did not cover this issue, the ambiguity within TRIPS 
remains.135
Despite this remaining ambiguity, there are solutions that 
could better define the scope of TRIPS protection(s) that should 
be considered. First, there could be a definitive listing of what 
pharmaceutical products are subject to compulsory licensing 
under TRIPS. Such a proposal was passed in Canada in 2004.
  
136 
This list would provide clarity as to what drugs could be seized 
but would be difficult to implement. However, many Canadian 
observers raised the concern that such a list would greatly limit 
new drugs that could be subject to compulsory licensing.137
 
authority to manufacture all forms of medication). 
  
Furthermore, an attempt to make an exhaustive list would be 
difficult, given there are constant innovations and 
developments in medications. Indeed, this list would require 
constant update and enforcement would be an issue. 
 132. Hildpold, supra note 36, at 362. Many human rights activists made 
this criticism. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75. The press release 
discussed the claims made by India and how they were being addressed. No 
mention was made of an EU claim regarding the right of India to produce the 
drug in question. 
 135. As discussed previously, the EU may have been quick to settle to 
protect its own lucrative interests in a free trade agreement. EU-India Settle 
WTO Drug Trade Dispute, supra note 63.  
 136. Richard Elliott, Doha para 6 Implementation: EU proposal vs. 
Canadian legislation, IP-HEALTH (Nov. 1, 2004, 1:30 PM), 
http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ip-health/2004-November/007091.html. d. 
 137. Id. Many observers felt that the pharmaceutical industry would 
always lobby against the inclusion of more drugs to generic production. Such a 
limit would then run contrary to the goal of TRIPS, read together with Doha 
and the General Council decision. 
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Inconsistencies would lead back to the same issue currently 
facing countries. For example, the European Union could claim 
a drug for hypertension was subject to TRIPS protections. 
Canada, though, could decide that same drug was not subject to 
TRIPS protections. India could claim permission from Canada 
to manufacture the drug. But, if India ships the drug through 
E.U. waters, the drug could still be seized, despite India 
claiming the authority to manufacture the drug from Canada.  
As a result, such a list would have to come from the WTO or 
through multilateral negotiation between countries to ensure 
agreement on what drugs could seized in transit. Such 
multilateral negotiations would undoubtedly be time-
consuming. Overall, such a solution would be too cumbersome 
to properly address the rapidly evolving field.  
A second potential solution, proposed in the E.U., would be 
to define what “essential medication” means under TRIPS.138 
This would categorize drugs into essential and non-essential. 
One expert has proposed that criteria for determining when a 
drug is essential include “availability of alternative treatment, 
severity of the disease the medication is aimed at treating, and 
the capacity of the patent-holder to adequately supply markets 
that demand the patented product.”139 This distinction would 
allow different patent protection for essential and non-essential 
drugs.140 Such a proposal would solidify TRIPS without 
sacrificing the flexibility needed to produce generic drugs to 
meet public health emergencies. Generic drug producers could 
meet the demand caused by such diseases as AIDS, malaria, 
and tuberculosis while still respecting most of the 
pharmaceutical industry’s patents. Such a proposal still has its 
flaws. After all, the criteria proposed above is still subject to 
interpretation and would limit availability of many medications 
to developing countries.  In addition, this proposal gives more 
power to patent holders. If patent holders assert they can 
adequately supply the market, than it appears generic 
production may be outlawed. Such a meaning would clash with 
the idea behind the Doha Declaration, which sought to ensure a 
greater supply of medication to all countries.141
Nevertheless, this solution is still preferable, albeit with 
some minor tweaks; for instance, focusing more on the severity 
of the disease versus the capacity of the patent holder. Such a 
  
 
 138. Subhan, supra note 96, at 156.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. World Health, supra note 18. 
404 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol 21:2 
 
tweak ensures that if the disease is serious enough, generic 
production can take place without waiting for patent holders to 
decide if they can adequately meet demand. This criteria would 
then ensure that patent holders produce cheaply to meet 
demand for the severe disease or sacrifice the market to generic 
producers. Additionally, this solution better addresses the 
flexibility that comes with breakthroughs in medical research. 
Rather than amending a list every time a new drug is created, 
which could lead to domestic political battles over what drugs 
should be added, a new drug can be judged immediately by 
preset criteria. Such a definition could be proposed and 
implemented through a General Council decision, similar to the 
way in which generic exportation was permitted.  
Thus, analysis of the first ambiguity shows that little has 
changed as a result of the recent drug seizure cases. Solutions 
are still required. There needs to be a firmer definition of what 
medications are covered and a stronger process for 
remuneration, when needed. Such a solution would solidify 
international patent protection, aiding manufacturers and 
developing countries alike. We now turn to the study of how the 
seizures impacted enforcement proceedings under TRIPS.  
 D. DOES THE TRIPS AGREEMENT PROVIDE FOR THE STOP AND 
SEIZURE OF GENERIC MEDICATIONS? 
While the primary concern of the E.U. was the broad, 
aggressive interpretation of the TRIPS exceptions in producing 
generic medication, the principal concern of Brazil and India 
was the repeated seizures of generic medication. These seizures 
delayed shipments of medications for months at a time and, in 
some cases, resulted in the confiscation of the drugs.142
There are two issues at play. First, did the E.U. adequately 
provide notice of their enforcement procedures as required by 
the GATT? Second, does the seizure of such generic 
medications violate the principles of free transit found within 
the GATT and TRIPS? The relevant articles in regards to 
enforcement regulations, as discussed previously, are the 
following: Article X of the GATT and Articles 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 
 Again, 
an analysis of TRIPS provides little guidance as to whether the 
E.U. was acting within their legal authority in stopping and 
seizing medications. Nevertheless, such an analysis is 
important because it demonstrates how TRIPS was in part 
responsible for the ship seizure controversy. 
 
 142. See Freedman, supra note 126. 
2012] ANALYZING TRIPS 405 
 
55, 58, and 59 of TRIPS.143
India and Brazil first claimed the E.U. failed to publish 
information regarding their trade practices, in violation of 
Article X of the GATT.
 
144 India argued that the E.U. violated 
Article X because it failed to provide specific information about 
the rationale of the seizures.145 Article X provides that “[l]aws, 
regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of 
general application . . . shall be published promptly in such a 
manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them.”146 Here, India argued that even if the 
E.U. is able to justify its seizures, such seizures are still illegal 
because the E.U. failed to provide notice of such procedures to 
India, as required by Article X of the GATT.147
The E.U., though, could make a fairly strong defense to 
this claim by arguing that European Commission regulations 
gave adequate notice as required under Article X of the GATT 
and TRIPS. The E.U. ambassador claimed that European 
Commission regulations created the right to regulate and 
inspect all shipments to ensure they complied with domestic 
patent regulations.
  
148 Such regulations, they could then argue, 
gave adequate notice to countries that shipments passing 
through E.U. territory were subject to regulations that may 
lead to temporary seizure. Specifically, the E.U. can point to 
Regulation 1383/2003,149 which allows for patent holders to file 
complaints with customs authorities.150 After such a complaint, 
E.U. officials may seize the product for three days to determine 
whether the product is in violation of E.U. law.151 Furthermore, 
1383/2003 points to established E.U. regulations on the 
relevant customs process.152 Such detail should satisfy the 
requirement that such regulations be published for the benefit 
of other countries.153
 
 143. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 
   
59, ¶ 5; Request for 
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59. 
 144. Compare Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2, and 
Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4, with GATT, supra 
note 61, art. X ¶ 1. 
 145. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2. 
 146. GATT, supra note 61, art. X ¶ 1. 
 147. Compare Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 2, with 
GATT, supra note 61, art. X ¶ 2. 
 148. See Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 70. 
 149. Council Regulation 1383/2003, art. 4(1), 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7 (EC). 
 150. Id. art. 5(1). 
 151. Id. art. 4(1). 
 152. See id. art. 1.  
 153. See generally Commission Regulation 1891/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 328) 16 
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Brazil and India claimed that these regulations go beyond 
the authority prescribed for the E.U. in TRIPS and the Doha 
Declaration.154 Specifically, Brazil and India argued that the 
E.U. actions were in violation of Articles V of the GATT, and 41 
and 42 of TRIPS.155 Additionally, Articles 50 through 55 are 
also cited by Brazil.156 India and Brazil use these Articles to 
argue that the seizures were in violation of international law 
because they impaired the free transit of goods.157
India and Brazil both based a strong part of this claim on 
Article V of the GATT.
 
158 India specifically alleged that the E.U. 
violated this Article because the goods were merely in transit.159
Goods (including baggage), and also vessels and other means of 
transport, shall be deemed to be in transit across the territory of a 
contracting party when the passage across such territory, with or 
without trans-shipment, warehousing, breaking bulk, or change in 
the mode of transport, is only a portion of a complete journey 
beginning and terminating beyond the frontier of the contracting 
party across whose territory the traffic passes.
 
The statutory language of Article V(1) defines goods in transit 
as:  
160
The shipments of generic medication were never bound for 
the E.U. but for countries in Latin America and Africa.
 
161
 
(EC) (providing the provisions that allow for customs action to be taken 
against goods suspected to be in violation of domestic patent laws). These 
regulations are found on-line and easy to access. 
 Given 
that the goods were never to stop in E.U. jurisdiction, Article V 
protections should apply, preventing outside countries from 
 154. See generally Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, 
(arguing the these provisions were inconsistent with the GATT and TRIPS) 
 155. Id. ¶¶ 1,4; Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4. 
 156. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4. 
 157. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 5; Request for 
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 2. 
 158. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 1; Request for 
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4.  Brazil also alleged the EU to be 
in violation of Article XVI of the WTO, which requires notification of 
contracting parties of any subsidies. Id. at 4; GATT, supra note 61, art. XVI. 
This Article was not the focal point of the litigation and will not be analyzed. 
See Swaraj Paul Barooah, India, Brazil Start Dispute Proceedings Against EU, 
SPICY IP (May 18, 2010, 2:50 PM), 
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/05/india-brazil-start-dispute-
proceedings.html. (claiming that the strongest arguments for India and Brazil 
came from within TRIPS and Article V of the GATT). 
 159. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 1. 
 160. GATT, supra note 61, art. V ¶ 1. 
 161. Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 68. 
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interference.162 However, Subsection 3 may provide a basis for 
E.U. defense.163 This section allows for reasonable delay so that 
goods may be entered and inspected to ensure compliance with 
domestic customs laws and procedures, provided that any delay 
is minimal.164 E.U. officials argued that the cargo was only 
being checked to ensure that it was not to be diverted into E.U. 
ports.165
Brazil further argued that the E.U. did not meet the 
standard set forth in Article 52.
 However, given that no countries in the E.U. were a 
destination for the medication, such intrusive delay seems to go 
beyond the scope of ‘minimum delay.’ Rather, the E.U. should 
have limited its customs procedures to ensure the drugs stayed 
in transit, which would not require their seizure. 
166 As one commentator points 
out,167 Article 52 requires that in order for seizure to take place 
“under the laws of the country of importation, there is prima 
facie an infringement of the right holder’s intellectual property 
right and to supply a sufficiently detailed description of the 
goods to make them readily recognizable by the customs 
authorities.”168 Essentially, there must be a risk that the 
medicine being seized will be availed to the domestic market.169
The first relevant article in applying this standard is 
Article 50. This article gives nations the authority to regulate 
and inspect all shipments under provisional measures to 
ensure they are in compliance with TRIPS and the Doha 
Declaration.
 
The problem is this standard was difficult to interpret and 
apply. 
170 Such measures are intended to give Members of 
the WTO the ability to regulate patented goods.171
 
 162. Id. 
 These 
provisional measures provide countries the authority to enforce 
their domestic laws, specifically “to prevent an infringement of 
any intellectual property right from occurring, and in 
 163. See GATT, supra note 61, art. V. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Brazil Slams EU for Seizure of Generic Drugs, supra note 70. 
 166. Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59, at 4. 
 167. Catherine Dounis, Note, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights via EU 
Border Regulations: Inhibiting Access to Medicine or Preventing Counterfeit 
Medicine, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 717, 748–49 (2011).  
 168. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 52. 
 169. Dounis, supra note 167, at 748. 
 170. See generally TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 50. Here, Dutch customs 
officials, upon inspection, found a generic version of Cozaar, an anti-
hypertensive drug produced by Merck. This discovery led to the subsequent 
seizure. See Stirrup & Hebditch, supra note 93.  
 171. Overview, supra note 1. 
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particular to prevent the entry into the channels of commerce 
in their jurisdiction of goods, including imported goods 
immediately after customs clearance” and to “to preserve 
relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.”172
The E.U. Ambassador Guth affirmed the E.U.’s right to 
seize the goods by citing Article 51,
 
173
Members shall, in conformity with the provisions set out below, adopt 
procedures to enable a right holder, who has valid grounds for 
suspecting that the importation of counterfeit trademark or pirated 
copyright goods may take place, to lodge an application in writing 
with competent authorities, administrative or judicial, for the 
suspension by the customs authorities of the release into free 
circulation of such goods.
 which states:  
174
Ambassador Guth argued that Article 51 gave it the authority 
to implement a customs system that allowed for temporary 
suspension of cargo.
 
175 In this instance, Ambassador Guth 
argued that the presence of generic medications in a 
Netherlands port was enough to justify a temporary seizure of 
cargo.176 Specifically, Ambassador Guth argued that its seizure 
was necessary to ensure the drugs were not being brought into 
the Netherlands or other countries, undermining domestic 
patent protection.177
One can again see the problems caused by the ambiguity 
found within these agreements. The E.U. can argue that 
seizing the cargo did not amount to a violation of the GATT, 
because the cargo was stopped only to ensure compliance with 
domestic customs procedures. At the same time, India and 
Brazil can make the argument that the drugs should not have 
been seized because they were never meant to end up in E.U. 
markets. The clash between these two arguments immediately 
raises questions over the Articles’ interpretation. The issue is 
whether European Commission regulations may apply to goods 
that merely pass through (Article V, goods-in-transit) or 
whether it may only apply to goods which are being exported to 
E.U. members.  
  
Given these ambiguities, there was hope that settlement 
would provide greater guidance to this element of TRIPS. 
 
 172. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 50(a)–50(b). 
 173. See Guth, supra note 68. 
 174. TRIPS, supra note 27, art. 51. 
 175. See Guth, supra note 68. 
 176. See Stirrup & Hebditch, supra note 93 (“. . . Dutch officials deemed the 
“storage” of the patented drug on Dutch soil to be infringement of the Dutch 
patent.”). See also Guth, supra note 68 (“. . . Duth authorities temporarily 
detained . . . a small shipment of drugs . . . in order to control it.”) 
 177. See Guth, supra note 68. 
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Again, we turn to the resolution reached between India and the 
E.U. to understand what lessons can be applied in further 
TRIPS interpretation. 
 E. THE INDIAN AND E.U. SETTLEMENT PROVIDES GUIDANCE AS 
TO WHAT CONSTITUTES ACCEPTABLE ENFORCEMENT. 
Despite the lack of resolution on the issue of essential 
medications, the E.U.-India settlement made substantial 
progress in settling the issue of customs enforcement. India, as 
previously discussed, agreed to suspend its suit against the 
E.U. in exchange for amendments to E.U. customs regulations 
and seizure protocols. The specifics of the E.U. reforms are still 
in progress, but it seems that any potential reform will include 
the following proposals. First, the E.U. will no longer be able to 
seize medications on the basis of an E.U. patent alone.178 
Second, the European Commission will revise Regulation 
1383/2003, which was the initial basis for the seizure.179 The 
specifics to the overhaul of this regulation have not yet been 
made clear, but preliminary statements suggest the E.U. will 
be required to demonstrate that the seized drugs were intended 
to be sold within E.U. markets.180 Finally, it will likely require 
that, upon seizure, some proof of evidence must be provided to 
the shipping company as to the rationale for the seizure of the 
drugs.181
Under the new settlement terms, the E.U. will have a 
much higher standard to reach in order to justify the seizure of 
medications. Prior to this agreement, E.U. officials had seized 
many drugs on the basis that their sale within E.U. borders 
 The settlement terms greatly favor India and deal 
primarily with the customs procedures of E.U. territories. A 
comparison of the proposed reforms with the previous terms 
demonstrates several important changes made to the E.U.’s 
understanding of enforcement proceedings under TRIPS. 
 
 178. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75. 
 179. Id. The original regulation gave broad powers to customs officials in 
suspending the transit of goods, giving them the authority to suspend goods 
“for the period necessary to determine whether suspect goods are indeed 
counterfeit goods, pirated goods or goods infringing certain intellectual 
property rights.” Council Regulation (EC) 1383/2003, ¶ 5, 2003 O.J. (L 196) 7. 
 180. Phil Taylor, Dispute over EU Drug Seizure Nears Resolution, 
SECURING PHARMA (Aug. 2, 2011), http://www.securingpharma.com/dispute-
over-eu-generic-drug-seizures-nears-resolution/s40/a1004/. 
 181. Id. India had frequently complained that the EU would seize goods 
with no explanation, as was required under the TRIPS agreement. India, 
Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, supra note 44. 
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would constitute a violation of E.U. laws.182 India always 
objected, claiming that such goods were merely in transit 
through E.U. ports and were intended to be sold in other 
countries, which would not be a violation of E.U. law.183 Under 
the terms of the settlement, the E.U. has agreed to seize 
materials only in cases where “there is adequate evidence that 
satisfies the customs authorities that there is a substantial 
likelihood of diversion of such medicines on to the E.U. 
market.”184 In doing so, the E.U. has increased its standard of 
seizure, having to provide substantial evidence that shows any 
shipment of generic medicine is meant to be sold within E.U. 
territory.185
This heightened standard will be implemented through the 
proposed reforms to European Commission regulations.
 
186 The 
proposed reforms will provide important answers about the 
extent of which countries can take action to protect markets. 
Initially, European Regulation 1383/2003 was interpreted to 
allow the seizure of any drug that made its way through 
European territory.187 As has been discussed before, India and 
Brazil had held that such interpretations violated the GATT 
Articles of free trade and transit.188
Such a solution appears to make sense. As one 
commentator points out, the previous E.U. interpretation of 
TRIPS made “goods illegal that were legitimate in their country 
of origin and destination country.”
 The E.U.’s change of 
standard clarifies an important ambiguity of TRIPS 
enforcement. Patent protection enforcement must now be solely 
for the protection of domestic markets. No longer can seizures 
be made to effectively protect the violation of a domestic patent 
overseas. Such an interpretation is beneficial because it 
promotes free transit of goods. In addition, a pharmaceutical 
producer’s complaint can no longer be the basis for the seizure 
of medication. Such an interpretation would promote an 
important principle in international trade; countries should 
respect the flow of transit over the domestic protection of goods.  
189
 
 182. See Taylor, supra note 
 This same commentator 
180. 
 183. India, Brazil raise dispute over EU drug seizures, supra note 44. 
 184. Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75. 
 185. See Taylor, supra note 180. 
 186. See Press Release, Gov’t of India, supra note 75. 
 187. See Taylor, supra note 180. 
 188. Request for Consultations by India, supra note 59, ¶ 5; Request for 
Consultations by Brazil, supra note 59. 
 189. Dounis, supra note, 167, at 748. Essentially, a good produced in India, 
bound for Brazil, legal in both countries, could be seized because a different 
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expressed concerns that previous interpretations of TRIPS 
would force countries to redirect trading routes in order to 
avoid countries with strict TRIPS enforcement protocol.190 Such 
a process would have been greatly inconvenient and 
inefficient.191 The proposed reforms, as they stand, will ensure 
that such efficiency will not be sacrificed in the name of patent 
protection. Furthermore, it reinforces the independence that 
the TRIPS exceptions were created to protect.192 After all, 
TRIPS, when read together with the Doha Declaration and the 
General Council Decision, was designed to ensure that 
countries maintained their autonomy in developing their own 
patent protection and enforcement procedures.193 By ensuring 
that goods are free to move, provided they are legal in both the 
host country and destination country, the reforms ensure that 
countries can set their own patent agendas without the fear of 
another country’s agenda interfering. As a result, the proposed 
changes likely ensure that future seizures will be more 
carefully made, as countries will now be expected to 
immediately provide an explanation for their actions. Previous 
seizures required less evidence and made countries more apt to 
seize drugs.194 Because of this change, countries will be more 
cautious in enforcement, as they will be expected to 
immediately turn evidence over. This raises the standard to 
seize generic medications (or any good produced under the 
auspice of TRIPS). And these heightened standards ensure that 
such drug seizures will decrease in frequency. 195
These settlement provisions, as discussed above, would 
 
 
nation deemed it illegal.  
 190. Id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Overview, supra note 1. 
 193. Such autonomy would allow developing countries to maintain access 
to needed medications. Id.  
 194.  See Taylor, supra note 180 (arguing that previous standards for 
seizure were so low they allowed for frequent search and seizure). 
 195. One interesting point remaining from the settlement is the lack of 
resolution between Brazil and the EU.  See EU-India Settle WTO Drug Trade 
Dispute, supra note 63. Perhaps the most prominent reason for this is the fact 
that Brazil has been more aggressive in its use of compulsory licensing under 
the auspice of the TRIPS agreement. See Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing 
Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (2009); see also Harris, supra 
note 57, at 387 (discussing Brazil’s use of compulsory licensing). Thus, Brazil 
may be looking to more strongly assert their rights to generic production. 
Additionally, Brazil, having pursued this more aggressively, without a free-
trade agreement at stake, may be demanding some sort of reparation. This 
litigation will be interesting to follow, as it may answer more questions about 
the production of generic medications. 
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provide much-needed consistency to international patent 
enforcement regimes and should be adopted worldwide. While 
the India settlement deals only with E.U. provisions, the WTO 
should ensure other countries consider their adoption; 
alternatively, the WTO could consider amending TRIPS 
through a General Council decision to at least promote their 
serious consideration.  
However, this type of WTO action would be contrary to a 
premise behind TRIPS, which was designed to allow nations to 
enact more stringent patent protections if they so chose.196
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Perhaps pressure from this suit will signal to other countries 
the standards needed to stop and seize drugs. However 
subsequent WTO panels will need to adopt standards similar to 
those conceded by the E.U. in its settlement. This will force 
countries to reevaluate their domestic procedures to meet the 
standards found in this settlement. This is a slow process and 
requires further suits to be filed against other offending 
countries, should seizures occur in the future. Short of outright 
renegotiation of TRIPS, this is the best way to ensure the 
settlement standards are applied worldwide. 
The recent drug seizures by the E.U. have been costly both 
in terms of money and health, and perhaps have reduced access 
to some medications. Such seizures have demonstrated the 
problematic ambiguities of TRIPS. Despite being created to 
enforce international patent laws while still protecting public 
health, the uncertainty of TRIPS has led to inconsistent 
interpretations, and costly domestic seizures of goods in transit. 
An analysis of the seizures shows that TRIPS is inherently 
uncertain about what type of medications can be produced and 
how countries may enforce domestic patent laws.  
The recent settlement of the Request for Consultations 
Regarding Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit  helps to solve 
one ambiguity of TRIPS and its exceptions while leaving the 
other open. The settlement does little to answer the question of 
what medicines can be produced under TRIPS but 
demonstrates that free transit of goods should be of the upmost 
importance. Thus, going forward, E.U. seizures will likely 
cease, but there will still be important questions to answer 
regarding the scope of TRIPS in the production of generic 
medication. As discussed above, such questions can be 
 
 196. See Overview, supra note 1. 
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answered through the creation of a list of drugs that can be 
generically produced under TRIPS, or alternatively, through a 
more clear definition of the types of drugs TRIPS was meant to 
cover. The latter proposal is the best solution, as it allows 
TRIPS to stay relevant to new medications and can better be 
enforced through the WTO. 
Nevertheless, this controversy helped to resolve one 
important ambiguity found within TRIPS. By ensuring stricter 
standards for the stop and seizure of medications, this 
settlement’s emphasis on free transit ensures that countries 
can no longer seize drugs without credible evidence that their 
own domestic supply is being affected. If the WTO can adopt 
such standards in its subsequent decisions interpreting TRIPS, 
this settlement will have helped to ensure greater protection 
for the free transit of generic medications. Importantly, free 
transit will continue to ensure a steady flow of medications for 
lesser-developed countries in need. 
 
